

**KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN**  
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# **THE E.U.'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEFICIT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST**

The road from the Maastricht Treaty to the European  
Constitution

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DISSERTATION  
submitted to obtain the  
degree of Master of European Politics  
and Policies by

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Academic year 2004-2005

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like first of all to thank my promoter professor Laurent Van Depoele for his invaluable and untiring help during the whole academic year. He was there, guiding me and giving me his valuable input in order to fulfill this dissertation. I would also like to thank Mr. Nico Van Dijck for the comments he had made on the draft paper of this dissertation and for his overall help, that he provided to me. For the successful completion of the statistical research which was contacted through questionnaires in two different universities of Jordan (Yarmouk University, Jordanian University) I would like to thank my uncle, Professor Samir Hamdan of the Yarmouk University of Jordan and Mrs. Fawzieh Bader, language instructor in the Jordanian university of Amman. With out their invaluable help it would have been impossible to conclude this statistical research. Last but not, in any way, least I would like to thank my family for their financial and emotional support that they provided to me during the whole academic year while studying at the Catholic University of Leuven.

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation tries to explore E.U. – Middle East relations in an effort to highlight the strengths and weaknesses. During this course, the term “deficit” was utilised in order to characterise their state of relations. In the ‘Introduction’ attention is drawn to the importance of the E.U. – Middle East relations and the term “deficit” is defined. Continuing, in ‘Part I’ a small historical overview is contacted, having as a starting point the First World War (WWI) until the end of the 80’s, in order to frame and highlight the background that brings to our days and defines the current state of their relations. Furthermore, the E.U.’s evolution in the field of the external relations is illustrated beginning from the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) until the European Constitution, focusing in particular on the developments at the Second Pillar. In ‘Part II’, an exploration of the causes contributing to the ongoing “deficit” in the E.U. – Middle East relations has been tried in order to underline them. Finally, in the ‘Conclusions’ an endeavor has been made to bring to light possible solutions which could contribute in reducing the described “deficit” in the external relation of the E.U. towards the Middle East. Both in ‘Part II’ and the ‘Conclusions’ an utilisation of the statistical analysis of the research contacted in a country of the Middle East (Jordan) through questionnaires is being made in order to help in the analysis made in those part of the dissertation.

THE E.U.'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEFICIT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE  
EAST. THE ROAD FROM THE MAASTRICHT TREATY TO THE  
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION.<sup>†</sup>

Introduction

The geographical area around the Mediterranean Sea, for centuries, united and divided at the same time Europe<sup>1</sup> and the Middle East<sup>2</sup>. The areas around the Mediterranean basin were always a vibrant place having gave birth to numerous civilisations like the Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Arabic stretching and exerting influence beyond their narrow geographical boundaries and historical periods. Middle East, especially, was the place that gave birth to three major monotheistic religious: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The geographical proximity of Middle East with Europe helped also to establish and nurture a cultural proximity along with strong economic ties stretching back thousands of

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<sup>†</sup> In dear memory of my friend Giorgos Filladitis.

<sup>1</sup> The term Europe differs from the term European Union/E.U. that is going to be used extensively in this dissertation. Europe is going to be defined as '*an extensive peninsula of the Eurasian land-mass which is bounded N and NE by the Arctic Ocean, NW and W by the Atlantic Ocean, S by the Mediterranean Sea, and E by Asia beyond the Ural Mts.*' (Crystal, 2000, p.394)

<sup>2</sup> The term Middle East can be found with different meanings and interpretations. This term, in general, has been used to describe '*a loosely defined geographical region encompassing the largely Arab States to the E of the Mediterranean Sea, together with Cyprus, Turkey, and the countries of the North Africa. The region conventionally includes the countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia,, Algeria, and Morocco*' (Crystal, 2000, p.726) along with the Palestinian Occupied Territories. In this dissertation a more narrow version of the term Middle East will be used excluding all the countries of North-West Africa (the so called 'Magreb' (Cleveland, 1994; Hourani, 1991, p.94-5)), along with Turkey and Cyprus coming more in line with the term used by Albert Hourani in his book 'A history of the Arab peoples' (Hourani, 2002) as also other authors (Cleveland, 1994, Preface). There will be a more thorough elaboration of this term in the 'Methodology chapter'.

years reinforced by significant populations with origins in the region of the Middle East living in Europe.(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.5)

In contemporary times, Europe and the Middle East remain firmly interconnected economically and culturally. In the economic realm the European Union<sup>3</sup> (hereafter E.U.) that encompasses most of the European countries has substantial economic interests in the region of the Middle East, in what ever way they are measured. For example, E.U. is importing a great deal of its oil from the Middle East in an increasing rate. In 1994 the European Communities (hereafter E.C.) oil imports from the Gulf Cooperation Council<sup>4</sup> (hereafter G.C.C.) countries accounted to 23,7% of the overall, expected to rise approximately to 50-60% by 2010(Hollis, 1997, p.26), and thus making the E.U. dependant in the energy area.(Roberson, 1998, p.184) The importance that the E.U. grants to the region can be also seen by the different financial support that it provides. Just for the 2003 the E.U. budget has allocated 768 million euros under the ‘External Relations’ heading to the Middle East, coming as the first region in financial expenditure. Under the ‘Humanitarian Aid’ heading of the budget again the Middle East receives 137.139.000 euros coming just second after the ACP<sup>5</sup> countries. Also, the Mediterranean countries come first by far in the amounts of E.U. funding through

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
<sup>3</sup>*‘European Union (E.U.), formerly known as the European Community (EC). An organisation of European nations committed to increase economic integration and political, judicial and social co-operation among its member states’*(Crystal, 2000, p.395). It currently encompasses 25 member states with Romania and Bulgaria expected to enter in 2007 raising the number to 27.

<sup>4</sup> The Gulf Co-operation Council is an organisation encouraging co-operation among the Arab states in the Persian Gulf area. It was established in 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.(Crystal, 2000, p.492)

<sup>5</sup> ACP countries: African Caribbean Pacific countries.

loans, 1,672 million euros just for 2003 with a ceiling of 6,425 million euro.(European Communities, 2004, p.76-7, 86-9, 99-100) If the trade balance between the E.U. and the MEDA<sup>6</sup> countries is taken into account between 1988-2001 it can be seen that a continues trade surplus in favour of the E.U. exists.(European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2004b, p.23). One has only to look at the following figure to get an idea of the importance of the region as a trade partner for the E.U. (*Graph 1*)

*Graph 1. The E.U. trade with MEDA countries, 1988-2001*



**Source: Eurostat**

<sup>6</sup> MEDA stands for “MEasures D’Accompagnement”. Council Regulation of 23 July 1996, on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of the economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is related to 12 countries located around the Mediterranean’s southern and eastern coasts. Namely, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.(European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2004b, p.23) Since 2004 Cyprus and Malta are full member states of the E.U.



The same applies also if it is taken into the account the countries of the Middle East as defined in this dissertation excluding those of the Magreb region. In the following tables it can be seen that the countries of Middle East, which this dissertation is focusing on, take up a considerable percentage of the E.U.'s trade either if it is seen from the export side or from the import side. It could be said, from a first look, that a downwards trend exists implying a marginalisation of the E.U.'s trade with this region when someone compares the percentage of E.U.'s export to the region in 1990 (9,2%)(European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2004a, p.41) to that of 2000 (7,1%), but it must be taken into consideration the special events that contributed to this trend the previous decade.(Table 1)

*Table 1.*

*The EU's trade with the Near and Middle East (exports)*

<b>Main partners Share (%)</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Near and Middle East</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.5</b>
<b>of which Lebanon</b>	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
<b>Syria</b>	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
<b>Iraq</b>	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
<b>Iran</b>	1.4	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.0
<b>Israel</b>	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1
<b>Jordan</b>	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	2.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3
<b>Kuwait</b>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
<b>Bahrain</b>	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Qatar</b>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6
<b>Oman</b>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Egypt</b>	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6

One event is the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait, the subsequent war that followed and the sanctions imposed to Iraq virtually bringing to a halt the trade with this country and cumulating to a domino effect to the regional economies of the surrounding countries. A second important event that contributed to this trend was, undoubtedly, the low oil prices that significantly reduced the income of the rich petrol producing countries of the G.C.C. of the region with its adverse effect to the their purchasing power having an immediate effect to their trade balance with the E.U. The subsequent budget deficits of these countries amplified by the burden of

the allied operations cost against Iraq in 1991 did not help also the situation. Last but not least, the brake down of the Oslo agreement and the following eruption of violence in Israel/Palestinian Occupied Territories was one defining fact of the downward trend observed in the 90's.

Nevertheless, the volume of trade with this region remained a significant portion of the E.U.'s total trade (7,1% in 2000)(European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Communities., 2004, p.41) with an observable upward trend (7,3% in 2001-02 and 7,5% in 2003). This along with the agreement for the 2010 Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone(European Commission., 2004, p.19) in the '*Barcelona Declaration*' opens new prospects of co-operation in the economical field between E.U. and the Middle East envisaging to create the biggest free trade area in the world(Gomez, 2003, p.74; Moratinos, 2000, p.14; Tausch & Herrmann, 2001, p.10) and allocating for the 2000-2006 period though the MEDA II programme to the 12 Mediterranean partner countries 5,35 billion Euro(European Commission & European Commission. DG Budget, 2002, p.240) which shows the significance the region acquires for the E.U. Through the same MEDA I program for the 1995-2000 period the following fund allocations occurred as the following table shows.(Table 2) It can be easily observed the difference in the sums between the two columns, 'Commitments' and 'Payment'. The former refers to the sums that were allocated for each country by the E.U. for the MEDA I program and the latter shows the actual sums that were used by each MEDA country in different projects. The gap between the 'Commitments' and 'Payments' columns is truly

vast showing a great under utilisation of funds from the part of the MEDA countries, something that is going to be addressed latter on.

*Table 2.*

*MEDA funding 1995-2000 (in million euros)*

	Com m itm ents	Pay m ents
M o r o c c o	7 9 6 . 6	1 6 6 . 8
A l g e r i a	1 9 4 . 2	3 0 . 4
T u n i s i a	5 0 3 . 6	1 8 3 . 9
E g y p t	6 9 8 . 7	2 2 1 . 5
J o r d a n	2 6 9	1 9 2 . 5
L e b a n o n	1 8 2	3 1 . 7
S y r i a	1 3 7	0 . 3
T u r k e y	5 5 1 . 1	3 0 . 2
W e s t B a n k / G a z a	2 0 7 . 7	8 5 . 2
R e g i o n a l	5 7 7 . 8	2 7 7 . 9
T O T A L	4 1 7 9 . 8	1 2 2 0 . 5

**Source: European Commission**

Nevertheless, the E.U. even though having important vested interests in the region, is interconnected through different ways (economically, culturally, colonial past, migration etc.) and being one of the major economical powers in the world finds itself unable (or unwilling?) to play an important role and influence at the evolutions that take place in the region and to take its place as an important international actor in the region alongside the U.S.A. The inadequacy of the E.U. to be an important actor in the region can be shown by different examples. The most obvious and recent event could said to be the division over the issue of the U.S. assault and subsequent occupation of Iraq where E.U. was divided in two camps rendering it unable to voice a single stance and therefore influence the course of the events accordingly to its positions and policies. This “inadequacy” in relation to the region of the Middle East that is a product of the vast gap between

the interests and capacities of the E.U. and the influence that is able to exert is described in this dissertation by the term ‘deficit’<sup>7</sup>.

As a starting point for the exploration of this deficit is taken the signing of the ‘*Treaty on European Union*’ (TEU) also known as Maastricht treaty, which took its name from the homonym city of Netherlands where it was signed, and it continues to the contemporary times until the ‘*Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*’. There are different reasons why the Maastricht Treaty was chosen as a starting point. The most self explained one is that, with the Maastricht treaty, was the birth of the E.U., as it is known. Of course, the E.U. did not come from a parthenogenesis since is a continuation or rather an incorporation of the European Communities which under the Maastricht Treaty become its first pillar, also know as ‘Community Pillar’. Secondly, it was with the Maastricht treaty that a second pillar was introduced, alongside the E.C., that of the Common Foreign and Security Policies (hereafter C.F.S.P.) which transformed the E.U. from merely an economically based entity to an a “polity(?)” with competences and expectations in the area of foreign policy and leaving the door open for incorporating a common defence policy in the future. Again, the C.F.S.P. was not a total innovation but rather came more as a natural evolution of the European Political Cooperation (hereafter E.P.C.) introduced in the 70’s.

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<sup>7</sup> A more precise and elaborate definition of the term ‘deficit’ will be given in the following ‘Methodology’ chapter.

The main question that this dissertation is going to address and revolve around is: ‘Why is there an external relations deficit at the E.U. external relations towards the Middle East and what was the impact of the different treaties - from ‘The Treaty on European Union’ (hereafter Maastricht treaty) to ‘The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (hereafter European Constitution). The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that the reasons for this ‘deficit’ of the E.U.’s external relations are both internal<sup>8</sup> and external<sup>9</sup> – with the internal factors playing the most predominant role in the shaping of the deficit.

The purpose of this study is partly descriptive, explanatory, and also emancipatory. Explanatory in the sense that it will try to explain what is happening in the field of the E.U. external relations towards the Middle East. What existing policies (or unexisting) of the E.U. shape the external relations deficit towards the Middle East? How do the E.U. and the countries of the Middle East interact in order to overcome this problem? Descriptive in the sense that it is going to try to present the events and processes occurring in the field of the

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<sup>8</sup> The internal factors stem from different sources; like the fact the C.F.S.P. is under the II pillar of the Maastricht treaty requiring intergovernmental cooperation - regarding decisions in those areas - in contradiction to the other issues under the Title I pillar where Q.M.V. is required for taking decisions, thus hindering the whole decision making process and making it difficult to come to a common position; an other reason is the fragmented approach towards the region, where different groupings of countries is used, often with not adequate justification; a third reason is the fragmentation of the E.U. policies towards the Middle East region where different policies and different instruments are used often with no interconnection or co-ordination (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Neighbourhood policies, relations with the Gulf Co-operation Council etc.); there is also an internal fragmentation in the E.U. with no single commissioner entrusted with the external relations as a whole, for example, or an intergraded and unified external relations service staffed with permanent staff.

<sup>9</sup> The external factors are the different crises occurring from time to time in the region like the Gulf war, for example, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Emerson, Tocci, & Patten, 2003, p.13-4), and also the actions and policies of other major actors in the region, like the U.S.A.

external relations of the E.U. towards the Middle East emphasizing on the period starting from the Maastricht treaty until the European Constitution.

The dissertation is going to be significant for reviewing the E.U. policies towards the Middle East. Its aiming it towards helping the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the current policies by highlighting them, and it is going to try suggest possible solutions to the different problems that are going to be highlighted and ways to overcome the existing deficit. Furthermore, it is hoping to contribute to the reinforcing of the existing literature regarding this area of study.

## Methodology

### Conceptual framework

The main concepts that are identified and defined in the dissertation are: external relations, deficit, and Middle East.

The term “*external relations*” is defined as both the economic and political relations that the E.U. has with the rest of the world. In the commission’s own words this means encompassing all those fields of E.U. activity currently under the first, second, and third pillar like: common trade policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), cooperation under bilateral and multilateral agreements, development cooperation, humanitarian aid and financial assistance as well as the external aspects of internal policies (energy, environment, transport, justice and home affairs, etc).(Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p.23)

The term “*deficit*” refers to and describes the apparent gap between the E.U.’s sheer size and capacities<sup>10</sup> in the global arena and its relevant inability to influence, to the extent that it would like and expect to, other international actors<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> ‘[E.U.] has a population of 450 million – more than the United States and Russia combined. It is the world’s biggest trader and generates one quarter of global wealth. It gives more aid to poor countries than any other donor. Its currency, the euro, comes second only to the US dollar in international financial markets.’(European Commission., 2004, p.3) ‘This potential is, however, partly unrealised. There is a gap between the EU’s economic weight and its political clout.’(Commission of the European Communities, 2004b, p.3)

<sup>11</sup> As a definition for the term ‘international actors’ Roy H. Ginsberg’s description will be taken: ‘International actors include nation-states (Russia, the United States); international organisations



in the world scene(Commission of the European Communities, 2004b, p.3) and in particular in the region of the Middle East. This “*deficit*” in relation to the Middle East is recognised by different authors like Rosemary Hollis when she argues that ‘*On economic and security, grounds Europe qualifies for a much more significant role in the Middle East than it is currently accorded.*’(Hollis, 1997, p.15) In the same theme continues Roberson, who says that ‘*the EU, although an economic power, lacks the ability to project the military power of its member-states, and with the existing structure of the international market it has been unable to translate its economic power into real political influence [in the Middle East].*’(Roberson, 1998, p.11). He goes on describing this gap with the term ‘*power deficit*’; the inability of the European states to engage in ‘*power politics*’ in the region of the Middle East, retaining only residual influence in the region, lacking the autonomous ability to project power to buttress the further development of their interests.(Roberson, 1998, p.14). Biscop, also identifies the discrepancy between the economic weight of the E.U. and its foreign policy especially in the area of the Middle East where he indirectly admits that the E.U.’s voice is not heard to the extent that it should be and its interests are partly taken into consideration.(Biscop, 2003, p.19) In measuring the existent ‘deficit’ in the region Ginsberg gives an interesting insight by trying to quantify the influence that the E.U. exerts on the region of the Middle East and in particular on Israelis, Palestinians, and the Middle East Peace Process (hereafter MEPP). He gives 67 different examples of which only 9 of them, or else only 13% of the total, are

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(*Council of Europe, OSCE*); *nongovernmental organisations (human rights, environment)*; and

considered as having ‘*significant impact*’ on the above-mentioned areas of interest. The above figures reaffirm the marginal political impact of the E.U., confirming the limits to the E.U.’s diplomacy in the region. (Ginsberg & Eizenstat, 2001, p.174, 279).

The term “*Middle East*” is defined as mentioned above in the ‘Introduction’ as the region encompassing the countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. This more narrow version of the term Middle East excludes all the countries of North Africa (the so called ‘Magreb’), along with Turkey and Cyprus coming more in line with both the term used by Albert Hourani in his book ‘*A history of the Arab peoples*’ (Hourani, 2002) and William Cleveland in his book ‘*A History of the Modern Middle East*’ (Cleveland, 1994, Preface). The reasons for incorporating and focusing on these countries when talking about the Middle East vary. To begin with, a conscious exclusion of Cyprus and Turkey was applied on the bases that the former is already a member state of the E.U., thus talking about external relations of the E.U. and one of its member states would be a paradox, and the latter has gained the status of a candidate country (European Commission., 2004, p.17) with discussions over membership to commence presumably in October 2005. A conscious effort was made also so as the term ‘*Middle East*’ will not be only a grouping of the region’s Arab countries thus transforming the E.U. – Middle East relations to E.U. – Arab relations. That was one of the reasons for

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*international regimes (G-8)* (Ginsberg & Eizenstat, 2001, p.55)

including countries like Israel and Iran. The inclusion of Egypt as a country of the Middle East although geographically situated on North Africa has to do with historical, political, and economic reasons. Egypt is inseparably intertwined with the other countries of the region; has participated in all the major Arab-Israeli wars; was the first Arab country to sign a peace agreement with the state of Israel; is actively engaged in the MEPP; has strong economic ties with the countries of the region; and exerts substantial political influence to the other countries of the Middle East. Nonetheless, the suggested specific grouping of countries comprising the region of Middle East is underpinned, mainly, by geographical, economical, historical, cultural and political criteria. It has to do with a fundamental vision that this dissertation has for the region related with the 'Part II' and the 'Conclusion' and which will be unraveled later on.

### Theoretical framework

This research is driven by the research paradigm of constructivism<sup>12</sup> and critical theory<sup>13</sup>. Based on this paradigm, this dissertation focuses on the production of

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<sup>12</sup> Unlike positivism and materialism, which take the world as it is, constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. Constructivism is an IR theoretical and empirical perspective which, maintains that IR theory and research should be based on sound social ontological and epistemological foundations. Constructivism is not interested in how things are but in how they became what they are. Constructivists use a large variety of methods: positivism, post-positivism, quantitative, qualitative, and combinations of them. A combination of quantitative and qualitative empirical methods has also been used to promote a critical approach-what Alker calls 'emancipatory empiricism'. (Carlsnaes, Risse-Kappen, & Simmons, 2002, p.95-8, 101)

<sup>13</sup> Critical constructivism in IR results from the combination of objective hermeneutics with a dissident interest in the emancipatory effects of knowledge. It is based on the view that, striving for a better understanding of the mechanisms on which social and political orders are based is also a

reconstructed understandings of the E.U. relations towards the Middle East, the impact of its policies and the deficit of them in reaching the premier goals set in the first place. The research paradigm of constructivism is also well linked with the statistical research conducted in the Middle East as part of this dissertation and which its results will be discussed in the ‘Part II’ and the ‘Conclusion’ of the thesis as also with the historical analysis conducted in ‘Part I’.(Carlsnaes *et al.*, 2002, p.101-2)

Constructivism and critical theory is enabling us to see the relations between texts concerning the E.U. - Middle East relations, their production and the historical moments in a political aware sense. (Seeing the people’s lives as produced by the political and historical moment and seeing textual representations as ways of exploring, arguing and debating things about how people lived.). In the theoretical framework of this dissertation globalisation theories<sup>14</sup>, which emphasize the influence of the economy in the international relations, have played a significant part.

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reflexive move aimed at the emancipation of society. In general, critical constructivism follows a pragmatic approach.(Carlsnaes *et al.*, 2002, p.98)

<sup>14</sup> Globalism emphasizes the overall structure of the international system or, more colloquially, the “big picture”. Secondly, Globalism assumes that it is not only useful but also imperative to use international relations from a historical perspective. Thirdly, although Globalism recognizes the importance of states – as – actors, international organizations and transnational actors and coalitions, the particular focus of their analysis is n how these and other factors act as mechanisms of termination by which some states, classes or elites manage to benefit from this capitalist system in the expense of others. Finally, Globalism emphasizes to a greater extent than either realists or pluralists the critical importance of economic factors when it comes to explaining the dynamics of the international systems.

### Data collection Approach

The dissertation is based on both collected and generated data. The collected data come from organizations, institutions and entities like the E.U. (Council, Commission, European Parliament etc.). Also, a major contribution in this research have texts and books concerning the E.U. – Middle East relations as well as all the treaties signed from the Maastricht treaty and onwards. A great part of the data have been collected from different academic journals related with the E.U. – Middle East relations.

The generated data mainly depart from questionnaires<sup>15</sup> that have been distributed to university students in two different universities in Jordan (Jordanian University - Amman; and Yarmouk University - Irbid) in order to investigate their knowledge and attitude towards the E.U. and its policies in the region. This is ultimately helping to have a better understanding of the deficit that the current policies create and will help in trying to formulate alternative ones. Usage of the questionnaires analyses is made at ‘Part II’ and ‘Conclusions’ of the dissertation.

Choosing Jordan as the country to contact this statistical research has to do with different ‘raison d’être’. To begin with, geography was an important reason behind

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<sup>15</sup> A sample of the questionnaire used in this research and the results from the statistical analysis of the data collected through the questionnaires can be found in the ‘Annex’. The research was conducted between the months of January and February of 2005 at the two before mentioned universities with the kind help of Professor Samir Hamdan and Mrs. Fawzieh Bader. The sample was of 100 questionnaires divided between men and women at 51% and 49% accordingly. The

the above-mentioned choice. Jordan lays in the heart of the Middle East, as it is defined, and it borders with a number of countries of the region like Israel/Palestinian Occupied territories; Lebanon, Syria; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; and Egypt. Its proximity with countries like Israel, protagonist in the ongoing Arab/Israeli conflict that tantalises to our day the whole region; like Iraq another 'Greek tragedy' figure; with the big and (oil) rich Saudi Arabia; with the 'big but still weak' Egypt; with the transforming Syria; and in transition Lebanon makes it a country well attuned to the realities, disillusion, needs and expectations of the region. With a population consisted more than 50% by Palestinian refugees makes it also quite aware and sensitive to the ongoing unsolved Palestinian problem, centrepiece of the MEPP and at the heart of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Its small size makes it very reliant on trade, a corner stone of the strategies that drive and get the E.U. driven. The high mobility of the Jordanian human capital, especially to the other countries of the Middle East contributes to a better understanding of the whole surrounding environment of the Middle East region. Also, the choice of a specific social group (university students) was not an accidental one. It has to do with the high percentage of young people comprising the society of Jordan and the other countries of the Middle East – more than 50% of those living in the region are under 18.(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.5)

Of course, there are limitations in this search, as in any other one. First of all, the relatively medium sample of the research (100 questionnaires), the sampling from

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participation was voluntarily and anonymous in line with the deontology of questionnaire survey.

only one country of the region, and one social group does not help in concluding generalised and solid results. That was not however the motivation behind this endeavour but rather it was a way to catch the “pulse” of the Middle Eastern society and especially of its young generation, the ones who are going to lead their countries the following decades. Another shortfall could be said to be the lack of input from experts and leading figures either in the E.U. – Middle East relation or at the societies of the two before mentioned regions in the form of interviews bringing us up to day with the current situation in the E.U. and the Middle East.

Both shortcomings are being acknowledged even though in the first instance the methodology of the research and the size of the sample seem to be in line with the one used by the United Nations (U.N.) in the course of the 2003 Arab Human Development Report contacted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Near and Middle East in 2002.(United Nations Development Programme. Regional Bureau for Arab States. & Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development., 2003, p.188) and with the same following report in 2004.(United Nations Development Programme. Regional Bureau for Arab States. & Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development., 2004, p.191-3) As for the shortcoming in obtaining interviews, it could be merely said to be overcome by the fact that different sources(books, articles, etc.) utilised in this dissertation are based on interviews as an instrument of generating data. In overall, a hampering factor, which had to be taken into consideration during the course of this

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(O'Leary, 2004, p.53-5)

dissertation, was the sheer size and time frame which was forbidding in pursuing this path of research.

The primary methods that are being utilized in the data collection approach are mainly: observation and review of the different documents collected. The secondary methods that are being used are: historical analysis and questionnaires.

### Data Measurement

In this dissertation it is examined and demonstrated in what way and to what extend the capabilities of the E.U. in the External Relations area developed through time having as a starting point the Maastricht Treaty where for the first time the C.F.S.P was introduced under the so called Second Pillar. By comparing the different Treaties until the Constitutional Treaty it will be made clear whether the competencies of the E.U. in the External Relations area have evolved or not. If the C.F.S.P. in the different Treaties and legal texts and especially in the Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe is expanded and reinforced then it will be a clear sign that the External Relations deficit is closing, if on the other hand the C.F.S.P. still remains under the Second Pillar (Inter-governmental) as it was originally introduced with the Maastricht Treaty relying on the intergovernmental approach, and unanimity is still needed as the standard method for decision making then it will be clear that the deficit still persists.





## Part I

### Middle East: from the WWI to the 90's<sup>16</sup>

There could be arguments that the timeframe taken for this historical analysis of the Middle East is too narrow or even too big, but the line had to be drawn somewhere and it is the first world war that is its starting point. WWI<sup>17</sup> qualified as the starting point as it was the beginning of major changes in the Middle East. It was the time, especially after the end of the war, where the whole map of the Middle East was redrawn rendering the Othoman empire, which included all these territories until then, obsolete and hailing the start of a new era where European countries like England and France would be directly involved in the region. The creation of semi-sovereign regional Arab and non-Arab states(Iran), or else known as ‘mandates’, given to the winners of the war - France and Britain. It was also the time where the famous, or for the Arabs infamous, Balfour Declaration<sup>18</sup> was made signaling the beginning of an ongoing “odyssey” in the Middle East with some of its consequences to be the creation of the state of Israel, the consequently Arab/Israeli wars, and the

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<sup>16</sup> The limitations of this dissertation does not allow to formulate a more elaborate historical analysis as it would be wished to nor was it possible to examine it from a country to country perspective either from the European side or from the side of the Middle Eastern countries.

<sup>17</sup> A war lasting from 1914 to 1918. It involved, in the beginning, two opposing great alliances which divide Europe in two, the “Triple Alliance” and the “Triple Entente”. It evolved later to include also other major world powers outside Europe like U.S.A. and Japan, in effect, globalising the war.

<sup>18</sup> *‘In an effort to appeal to U.S., Russian, and German Jewry and also to secure control over the territory adjacent to the Suez Canal, Britain agreed to favor the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This agreement – the famous Balfour Declaration of November 1917 – was conveyed in a letter from Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothchild, a prominent British Zionist.’*(Cleveland, 1994, p.153-4)

unsolved until our day “Palestinian issue”.(Cleveland, 1994, p.140-60; Hourani, 1991, p.315-22)

Again, it was another war (WWII) that would play the role of a catalyst in the region of Middle East. With the end of the war the reshaping of the region’s geographical boundaries began, representing the new balance of power and the interests of the world powers. Pivotal event in the region’s history, and something to haunt the region’s relations with Europe and the “West” until our days, was the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the following defeat in war of the neighboring Arab states. This event along with the declaration of independence from the different states in the region signaled the emergence in the region of the “nation states” and a fundamental shift in the relations between the Middle East and Europe. All the above were happening on the background of the diminishing European power in the region as expressed in the face of Britain and France and the emergence of two super-powers in the world, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The creation of the U.N. and the following “cold war” were defining events in the relations of the region with Europe and the “West”, in general.(Cleveland, 1994, p.188-9, 271-91; Hourani, 1991, p.351-65)

The next crucial turning point between the region of the Middle East and two of the major European powers (Britain and France) was the Suez crisis in 1956. The following war involving Egypt, Israel, France, and Britain, and the subsequent withdrawal, humiliation, and marginalisation of the European

influence in the region.(Roberson, 1998, p.185) The second effect of the “Suez crisis” was the de facto raise of the Arab nationalism movement in the region personified in the face of Gamal Abdul Nasser and the direct involvement of the two superpowers on the expense of the European influence.(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.51) Awkwardly, or for some a natural subsequent effect, after the ‘Suez’ fiasco French turned to Europe as an escape route of its external relations crisis in order to build a stronger Europe with a foreign and defense identity. The new European orientation was translated in the project of the European Defense Community (EDC)(Van Depoele, 2005), which was in the end turned down again by the French national assembly brought back in memory by the resent rejection of the European Constitution again by French.

The ensuing years saw a further rise of the Arab nationalism in its different forms in the region manifested in political turbulence and violent overthrows of governments as in Syria and Iraq. The height of the Arab nationalistic hopes for transformation of the region and their societies was raised and quickly set aside in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war or else the ‘Six day war’. It was one humiliating defeat for the Arab nationalistic regimes and the Arabs, in general, which sealed the military predominance of Israel in the region against any combination of Arab forces. The war involved Egypt, Jordan and Syria ending in the occupation by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, the West bank from Jordan, and the Golan heights from Syria.(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.56-7) It was an event that deeply traumatized the Arab psyche but also generated grave mistrust from both the Arab as also from the

Israeli side towards Europe. The years that followed the 1967 war and the positions that the E.C. formulated resulted in being paradoxically branded pro-Israeli from the Arab side and simultaneously pro-Arab from the Israeli side.(Asseburg, 2003, p.23)

The war and the following defeat of the Arab side, resulting in the occupation of the before mentioned territories by the Israelis, triggered the response from the Arab oil producing countries which declared an embargo to the countries they saw as pro-Israelis. In 1973, an other Arab-Israeli war broke out also known as the ‘Yom Kippur War’ resulting in a combined oil-production cut back by the OPEC with grave outcomes in world oil prices. The consequences were severe for the E.C. side.(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.76-7) The reduction of oil output and the oil embargos at selected countries (U.S.A., Netherlands) resulted in a sharp rise at the world oil prices by more than 400%, compared with the pre-embargo price levels,(Stauffer, 2003, p.51) severely hampering the heavily oil dependant economies of the “West” and in particular that of the E.C. countries. It was a new era where oil became a “weapon” in the hands of the otherwise weak countries of the Middle East(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.76; Van Depoele, 2005) bringing them enormous sums of money in revenues. A second effect was the fragmentation of the E.C. countries approach towards the region that followed the embargo. Instead of trying to formulate a common position an “each for himself” approach was followed.(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.65-6)

Next to the 'Six days' and 'Yom Kippur' war in the Middle East another event that would significantly change and influence the course of the events in the E.C./E.U. relations the following years was the Islamic revolution in Iran which resulted in the overthrow of the Shah, a trusted ally of the "West", and the final imposition of an Islamic theocracy on a country with rich oil and gas reserves. But, probably the most important factor in this regime change could be said to be not so much the instability in the flow of oil and gas to the international markets but the ideological and political influence that potentially could exert in the future the Islamic revolution to the other countries of the region and its impact in the relations of the E.C./E.U. and the whole region of the Middle East. The 'Six day war' with the following oil embargo and the Islamic revolution in Iran were the decisive facts that had forced the E.C. to formulate some kind of stance towards the region where vital interests were at stake. Products of this reality could be said to be the Euro-Arab dialogue initiated in the 80's; the Global Mediterranean Policy; and the formulation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). (Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.85)

Coming towards the end of the 80's the following events, by reverse chronological order, shaped the relations of the E.C. and the Middle East. The Palestinian uprising "Intifada", in 1987, brought into the Arab-Israeli conflict a new dimension and had accordingly influenced the stance of the E.C. as such. The following invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in 1982, and the 1980-88 war between the Baathist Iraq and the Theocratic Iran was also another element,

which could not be ignored, in the bumpy road of the E.C.-Middle East relations.(Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p.69) All this events where happening while the E.C. was trying to recover from the effects of the oil crisis, which hampered its member states economy, and tried to brake loose from the stagnation of the past decade that the E.C. was seen to be in.(Dinan, 2004, p.186) A daring reform scheme of the E.C. spearheaded by the Commission president Jacque Delores was put in motion resulting in the Single European Act (hereafter SEA) coming into effect in 1987(Nugent, 2003, p.58). With the SEA more attention and competences where given to the external relations of the E.C. while putting as a goal the completion of a Common Market by 1992 These two elements would be crucial in strengthening the E.C. and help it to be develop in a full-scale international actor.

### The road from the Maastricht Treaty to the European Constitution

#### **The Maastricht Treaty**

The following milestone after the SEA, and the height of the Commission president Jacques Delors, was the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It was concluded in December 1991, but only came into force almost two years latter in November 1993 with the launch of the E.U.(Dinan, 2004, p.233-4) It created the European Union, which was to be divided into three pillars: the European Communities; a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).(Nugent, 2003, p.63) The Maastricht Treaty streamlined some very important features

(Institutional; Policy; etc.), which would elevate the E.U. into a higher level as an actor in the international scene. The treaty itself clearly states as one of the objectives of the E.U. is:

*‘to assert the Union’s identity on the international scene’* (Council of the European Communities., Commission of the European Communities., & Great Britain., 1992)

In Nugent’s words some of the most important changes in the realm of policies that were bound to directly influence the external relations of the E.U. were:

In Pillar I (Community Pillar)

- *The main features of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were defined and a timetable for establishing it was specified.*
- *Some policy areas in which the Community had not been previously involved, or in which its involvement had not had an explicit Treaty base, were brought into the TEC for the first time.*
- *Community responsibilities in some policy areas that were first given treaty recognition in the SEA were further developed.*

In Pillar II (CFSP)

- *Systematic cooperation was to be established between the member states on any matter of foreign and security policy that was of general interests.*



- *In deciding in joint actions, or at any stage during the development of a joint action, the Council could determine that implementation decisions should be taken by QMV.*
- *The Western European Union (WEU) was requested ‘ to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which had defence implications...’*

Truly, the Maastricht Treaty was a milestone in the integration process of Europe.(Moussis, 2004, p.21) It strengthened the supranational aspects of the E.C. mapping an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)(Dinan, 2004, p.245) giving more powers to the European Parliament; more policy fields under the jurisdiction of the Commission; the ECJ was further empowered; and two new pillars were introduced with the most important of them that of the CFSP. The later one, even though intergovernmental was for the first time introduced under the E.U. and hesitatingly defense began to emerge as a potential E.U. policy field.(Nugent, 2003, p.68) Nevertheless, the creation of the second pillar for the CFSP and the expectations raised around it was a major “leap of faith” soon to show its limitations with the Yugoslavian war. It was then that it was clearly seen that the “King was indeed naked” with the E.U. being unable to deal with a crisis in its own “backyard”.

## **The Amsterdam Treaty**

Not long enough after the Maastricht Treaty was put in force a new enlargement with 3 member states (Sweden; Finland; Austria) was completed raising the number to 15 member states (Dinan, 2004, p.268-9) and a new Intergovernmental conference was under way in order to streamline the different aspects of the treaty.(Lenaerts, Van Nuffel, & Bray, 2005, p.57-8) The conference took place at Amsterdam in 1997 producing the homonym Amsterdam Treaty.

The main aspects of this treaty were, in relation to the external relations aspects of the E.U., the following:

- It made the European Council responsible for defining common strategies that would be implemented by the E.U. and the member states
- Designated a High Representative for the CFSP
- A Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit under his responsibility.(Moussis, 2004, p.22)
- QMV was established as the norm for adopting and implementing joint actions and common positions, thus transforming these instruments into supranational.

- ‘Constructive abstention’ was introduced enabling one member state not being obliged to apply the decisions taken by the other member states.
- For the first time, specific security issues were identified as falling within the remit of the E.U. with the incorporation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’<sup>19</sup>
- Last but not least, the CFSP financing was settled with most expenses being charged to the E.U. budget.(Nugent, 2003, p.75-6)

In Moussis words the above mentioned changes ‘*gave Europe a stronger voice in world affairs*’.(Moussis, 2004, p.22) This is something that it will have to be addressed in the ‘Part II’. What it didn’t do however was to prepare the E.U. for the foreseeable enlargement to the east with 10 new member states. This would be the biggest enlargement ever in the history of the E.U. and it was something that the following treaty would have to deal with.

### **The Treaty of Nice**

It was the treaty that would tackle the “Amsterdam leftovers”(extension of qualified majority voting, weighting of Council votes, and size and composition of the Commission)(Dinan, 2004, p.287; Nugent, 2003, p.81-2)

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<sup>19</sup> In June 1992 the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ was made at the WEU Ministerial Council at Petersberg, near Bonn, defining the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’, which include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping’.(Anonymous, 2004, p.261)

and ended up being labeled as “Nice was not nice”.(Van Depoele, 2005) The changes effecting the external relations of the E.U. are being summed up as follows:

- From 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2005, a qualified majority would be obtained if the decision received a specific number of votes and was approved by a majority of member states. The QMV was to replace unanimity in a number of third case provisions.(Moussis, 2004, p.23) The procedures adopted could be said that enhanced the complexity of the already rigid E.U. decision-making structure.
- The enhanced cooperation of some member states would be reinforced and facilitated.
- In the institutional field the powers of the parliament was reinforced.(Moussis, 2004, p.23)

In comparison to the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty one can notice that the Nice Treaty had not the same implications and impact to the external relations arena of the E.U., even though it gave the possibility for enhanced co-operation in the field of CFSP. As Lenaerts & Van Nuffel note there was no use made of the enhanced co-operation option, which provided more flexible conditions for co-operation among the member states in the field of the CFSP.(2005, p.65) The Nice Treaty could be said to have restricted itself to the absolutely necessary institutional-structural changes in the E.U. in order to facilitate the forthcoming enlargement with the ten new member states.

## The European Constitution

It was with the Laeken declaration in December 2001 that a convention on the future of Europe was decided to be convened that produced a draft constitutional treaty presented at the European Council of Thessaloniki in 2003.(Moussis, 2004, p.24) The produced treaty was divided in four parts and it was designed to simplify the legal structure of the E.U. by putting an end to the Pillar structure and by merging the E.U.'s intergovernmental fields of action with the field currently covered by the Community. This also applied to the CFSP which would be brought under a single Title (the Union's external action) along with the external competences of the Community even though decision-making still strongly remained in the intergovernmentalism realm.(Lenaerts *et al.*, 2005, p.70-1) Some of the most important features of the European Constitution in relation to the external relations capabilities of the E.U. are the following:

- *'The Union shall have legal personality'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.13 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-7)
- *'The Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.15 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-12, Par. 4)

- *‘The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall take part in its work.’*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.19 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-21, Par. 2)
- *‘The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once.’*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.20PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-22, Par. 1)
- *‘The President of the European Council shall...ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.’* (Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.20 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-22, Par. 2)
- *‘The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Constitution provides otherwise’*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.20 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-23, Par. 3)
- *‘The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union’s external action in the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent.’*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.21 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-24, Par. 3)
- *‘The first Commission appointed under the provisions of the Constitution shall consist of one national of each Member States,*

*including its President and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs who shall be one of its Vice-Presidents.*'(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.22 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-26, Par. 5)

- *'The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.23 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-28, Par. 1)
- *'The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He or she shall contribute by his or her proposals to the development of that policy, which he or she shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.23 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-28, Par. 2)
- *'The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.23 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-28, Par.3)
- *'The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He or she shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He or she shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be*

*bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.*'(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.24 PART I, TITLE I, Art. I-28, Par. 4)

- *'The European Union shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States actions.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.29 PART I, TITLE I, CHAPTER II, Art. I-40, Par. 1)
- *'The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on mission outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.30 PART I, TITLE I, CHAPTER II, Art. I-41, Par. 1)
- *'The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of*



*such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.*'(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.30 PART I, TITLE I, CHAPTER II, Art. I-41, Par. 2)

- *'Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armament (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measure to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluation the improvement of military capabilities.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.31 PART I, TITLE I, CHAPTER II, Art. I-41, Par. 3)
- *'The European decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Council as a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provide that at least one third of the Member States participate in it. The Council shall act in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article III-419.'*(Council of the European Union. & European Parliament., 2004, p.33 PART I, TITLE I, CHAPTER III, Art. I-44, Par. 2)


The list could go on and on, but what has been made quite obvious is that the European Constitution seems to be in the right direction in strengthening the E.U. capabilities in the area of the external relations. As Lenaerts & Van Nuffel observe, '*the E.U. Constitution reinforces the arrangements on the basis of which the union is to pursue its external policies.*'(2005, p.73) The above-mentioned changes that the European Constitution brings forward are a clear example of this course. The question that reasonably now rises is why the seemingly subsequent re-enforcements of the E.U., from the Maastricht Treaty until the European Constitution, in the field of the external relations do not translate into a more coherent and plausible external relations policy towards the Middle East. This is something that will have to be addressed in the 'Part II' of this dissertation.

## Part II

*'The Orient was almost a European invention...The Orient was orientalised not only because it was discovered to be "Oriental" in all those ways considered common-place by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made Oriental.'* (Said, 2003, p.1, 5-6)

This is how Said describes in his book 'Orientalism' the perception that the Europeans have about the "Orient" and how they deal with it. Could it be that the E.U. has a similar approach towards the Middle East? – A simple reproduction of an "Oriental" concept, meaning – formulating and applying policies in the external relations field produced by the Europeans, for the "Orientals" but without the latter? As Keukeleire puts it *'EU aims at transposing its own political, societal, and economic governing principles onto those regions, without a sufficiently critical evaluation of whether the necessary foundations exist in those countries to apply those principles.'* (Keukeleire, 2000, p.23) And if it is so could this be related with the "deficit" that it is observed in its external relations with the Middle East? This seems to be the case if it is taken into consideration the following answers given at the research contacted in Jordan.

Graph 2.



Source: Research contacted in Jordan

As it can be seen the E.U. involvement in the Middle East gathers a considerable 31% as 'Negative' in contrast to only 11% as 'Positive'. In overall if the 'Positive' and 'Rather Positive' answers are summed up in comparison to the answers of 'Rather Negative' and 'Negative' it can be seen that the former gather 41% and the latter 59%.

There is going to be a threefold approach toward this issue with a dichotomy between internal and external factors that influence the external relations "deficit" of the E.U. towards the Middle East. Under the former (internal

factors) category, fall the E.U.'s different instruments and policies dealing with the region of the Middle East; and secondly the structural – institutional factors related to the pillar structure of the E.U.(Keukeleire, 2002) In the latter (external factors) category, fall the different crises occurring from time to time in the region like the Gulf war, for example, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and most importantly the actions and policies of other major actors in the region, like the U.S.A.

#### Internal factors

To begin with, it has been made apparent from the previous analysis in 'Part I', taking in consideration the evolution of the E.U. competences mostly in the area of the C.F.S.P. from the Maastricht Treaty until the European Constitution, the awkward dichotomy between the commercial and trade policies, for example, of the E.U. on the one hand that fell under the "Community pillar" and the Foreign and Security policies on the other hand that fell under the "Intergovernmental pillar" in a way continuing even in the European Constitution.(Lenaerts *et al.*, 2005, p.899-900) The external relations either of a state or of the E.U. in an increasingly interconnected, some call it "globalised", world cannot be one sided either in relation to the economical or political aspects. These different aspects are closely intertwined in the field of the external relations something that the E.U.'s pillar structure seems to defy. It is agreed by different authors that the current pillar structure remains one of the

main reasons contributing to the external relations deficit towards the Middle East.(Gomez, 2003, p.175)

Furthermore, the lack of Q.M.V. that persist in the C.F.S.P. significantly reduces the flexibility in these policy fields;(Dehaene, 2003, p.229; Missiroli, 2000, p.13) increases the complexity and ‘inertia’;(Dehaene, 2003, p.241) and confirms the inconsistency in the decision making methods(Dehaene, 2003, p.241-2; Stavridis & Hutchence in Salama, 2001, p.81) used under the first and the second pillar with the predicaments that emerge with the latter one. All the above mentioned, as different authors argue contribute to the defined ‘deficit’ in the external relations field both in the world scene and in particular at the region of the Middle East.(Griller & Weidel, 2002, p.6, 9-10; Silvestri, 2003, p.55) Problems that directly stem from the dichotomy between the first and the second pillar are mainly structural like the lack of co-ordination(Lenaerts *et al.*, 2005, p.906) and consistency between the European Council and the Council of Ministers; the reliance of the decision making mechanism on unanimous voting; the inexistence of a permanent diplomatic structure along with the necessary instruments(at least until the creation of the standing Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military staff); and the lack of leadership from the part of the Presidency. (Keukeleire, 2000, p.12-3)This is one of the major reasons that hinders the E.U. to become an important actor in the region with all the understandable shortfalls in the pursue of the E.U.’s interests in the region.

There is also a lack of the appropriate instruments<sup>20</sup> that the E.U. would need in order to produce the expected results in the field of the external relations. A lack most apparent in the area of military instruments, (Keukeleire, 2000, p.9-11) especially when dealing with the Middle East.(Silvestri, 2003, p.50)Smith seems also to agree when she says that *'The E.U.'s lack of military instruments is its most conspicuous instrument 'deficit'.*'(1997, p.12) Also, there is a lack of willingness in using the already existent instruments that the E.U. has in its disposal. An obvious example is the unwillingness of the E.U. to use economic leverages, as coercion; sanctions; and threats(Gomez, 2003, p.140) as in the case of the Gulf countries,(Roberson, 1998, p.91) Iran,(Smith, 1997, p.14) or even Israel.

A second internal factor is the current policies and instruments that the E.U. has developed towards the Middle East. The most prominent of them is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (E.M.P.), but it does not stop here. There is also the Neighborhood policy which also encompasses different countries of the Middle East, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) that the E.U. is an integral part,(Gomez, 2003, p.124-33) and there should not be forgotten the co-operation with the countries of the GCC (Rhein, 1990, p.112-7) along with the individual bilateral agreements with each country in the region. In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership there seem to be an agreement among scholars for its inadequacy(Gomez, 2003, p.169, 79; Keukeleire, 2002, p.17-8), in the best

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<sup>20</sup> For a full list of the instruments in the disposal of the E.U. see Karen Elizabeth Smith's *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy: The instruments of European Union Foreign Policy.*'

of times. A further indication of the EMP's inadequacy can be seen by the low sums of money being absorbed by the MEDA countries in the framework of the EMP. The sums barely exceed the 25% of the total funds allocated for these countries by the E.U in the 1995-2000 period.(Own calculations based on: European Commission, 2000) In the MEPP the position of the E.U. is characterised as a follower of the U.S.A. policies or as Gomez puts it, '*It is evident that the E.U. was forced to settle for a limited and sporadic capacity to influence the Middle East Peace Process.*'(2003, p.140) As it can be seen there is a plethora of instruments dealing with the countries of the Middle East. This can only lead to an obvious overlapping of these different instruments and policies in the region with little or non co-ordination among them(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.8), limited depth, and scope(Keukeleire, 2002, p.17) with self explained problems in regard to the achieved goals of these policies and instruments.

#### External factors


With the end of the WWII and the start of the 'Cold War' there was a change of "guard" in the region of the Middle East. The influence of the European powers in the region, predominantly of England and French, declined and the power vacuum was replaced by the two super-powers of the world U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in the end of the 80s the field was clear to be monopolised by the only remaining superpower, the U.S.A.(Biscop, 2003, p.19) The predominant influence of the U.S.A. in the region of the



Middle East(Biscop, 2003, p.32) can be seen by its strong military presence (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq etc.) along with the political influence and the protagonist role that it exerts like on the Middle East Peace Process; the influence around the Iranian nuclear program, forcing Iran to negotiate under the threat of military action; the democratization initiative that has initiated for the Wider Middle East etc.

These examples can be read two ways either as a cause contributing to the E.U.'s external relations deficit towards the Middle East or as a result of the "deficit". It is obvious that a clear line can not be drawn. The predominant position of the U.S.A. in the region is a combination of both of them. It creates antagonism and frustration to the E.U. when it is not able to achieve the policy targets it has set in the first place. On the other hand the incompetence of the E.U. to intervene in the region and project its power and weight creates a power vacuum easily filled up by the U.S.A. The above-mentioned arguments seem to be supported by the results obtained by the research conducted in Jordan.

**Graph 3.**



**Source: Research contacted in Jordan**

All together male and female answer, to the question ‘Do you consider the E.U. an autonomous actor in the region or a follower of the U.S.A. policies?’, as an ‘Autonomous’ actor adding up to 50% in contrast to 42% who answer a ‘Follower’ with 8% not taking any position.

## CONCLUSION

The before mentioned analysis has tried to underline the existence of the deficit in the E.U.'s external relations towards the Middle East and to highlight the different factors that contribute at creating and supporting this deficit. The question that naturally is raised is whether there is a way forward for the E.U. enabling it to transcend its current deficit. What is going to be addressed now are different suggestions which could help in reducing the recognised deficit in the E.U.'s external relations towards the region providing possible solutions.

The Pillar structure of the E.U. has been identified as one of the major obstacles in overcoming the "deficit". The pillar structure even though it is not present in the European Constitution, nevertheless the intergovernmental character of the C.F.S.P. largely remains along with the obstacle of not having Q.M.V. as the standard decision making method.(Lenaerts *et al.*, 2005, p.70-1, 899-900) Furthermore, even the new important features that the European Constitution was introducing in the field of the external relation, or in the European Constitution's wording 'External action', like the position of Foreign Minister; the E.U. External Action Service;(Solana, 2005, p.259) President of the E.U. etc, are now in doubt. Legally, after the two referendums in French and the Netherlands resulting in the rejection of the European Constitution, it can be *de facto* considered "dead". As from the side of a political analysis the political weight of a "non" vote coming from a country like French can surely mean that the European Constitution is not just "dead" but also "buried", at

least as it is known in its current form. This can only mean a major setback in transforming the E.U. in a true international actor in the world scene and helping reducing the “deficit” in its external relations with the Middle East since the E.U. will have to continue functioning under the Nice Treaty, which it is truly not “nice”.(Van Depoele, 2005)

The different instruments used to target the region of the Middle East with the problems already identified need a major overhauling in order to better address the problems and needs of the region so as to transform in a true vehicle serving the interests of the E.U. and contributing in reinforcing the principles and fundamental values that the E.U. is founded on and has repeatedly stated that wants to promote (Liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law).(Council of the European Union, 2003, p.5-6, 2004, p.5) One possible solution could be the replacement of all these different instruments by a single one covering all the countries of the Middle East region as they have been defined, without for example the artificial division and exclusion of different countries of the region made in the EMP . After all, the countries of the region are historically interconnected as already shown in different ways; most of them share the same language, religion, and culturally are close to one another; people from one country (like Jordan and Lebanon) work in others, usually oil rich, countries of the region (like Saudi Arabia and U.A.E.); and reversibly people from the rich countries of the region massively choose other countries of the Middle East for their holidays (like Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt etc.); telecommunications like internet

and satellite channels like Al-Jazira further reinforce the links among the people of the region. This would mean an instrument geographically concentrated in the specific region. The existent divisions of different countries and different instruments in the region with the exclusion of many countries is also identified by other authors like Amin who in his own words argues that *'To separate Mediterranean from non-Mediterranean Arab countries is truly disastrous, and unacceptable. What is needed rather, is a Euro-Arab agreement or a dialogue – involving all the European and all the Arab countries, whether or not they are Mediterranean.'* (Amin, 2001, p.105) Some benefits from the creation of one single instrument dealing with the whole region of the Middle East would be simplifying the procedures in the E.U.-Middle East relations channeling them through one instrument; better enhancement of the integration process in the region in the political and economical field by forcing them to co-operate; making the E.U. more visible in these countries; help to make the relations in the region more transparent; and thus making the governments more accountable to the E.U.'s rules but also to their own populations.


A counter argument could be that all the countries of the region are quite diverse if compared among them with different characteristics (in geographical size, wealth, size of population etc.) thus grouping all of them together would not mean that they are or would actually function as a group. This is partly true but it should not be neglected that the instruments already in place like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Neighborhood policy include many

more countries and much more diverse if compared among them, so putting in place this new instrument would mean actually narrowing the existent gap and having a better targeting. The underutilization of funds allocated through the MEDA instrument to the countries of the region, just over 25% usage of the funds for the 1995-2005 period,(Own calculations based on: European Commission, 2000) also reinforces this notion of inadequacy with the existent instruments targeting the region. Furthermore, even in the case of the instruments already in place there is an individual approach followed by the E.U. towards each country rather than a '*one size fits all*' approach as the European Council itself admits.(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.4) This is not necessarily something bad if it is taken into account that differences truly exist, especially in the economical field, which need to be addressed. This individual "case-to-case" approach can also be followed in the new grouping of countries proposed, at least in the beginning as a preliminary phase helping to reinforce the interlinks among the countries of the Middle East and thus transforming it in a true regional bloc.

As for the external factors, that influence the external relations deficit, like the U.S.A. there is no chance that it could just simply "go away" so as not to have to be taken into account. Rather, as any other major power would do, the U.S.A. is pursuing its interests in the region as it perceives them and it seems that most of times are not in line with those of the E.U.(Biscop, 2003, p.19-20) It is true that the U.S.A. would in general not want to see a strong E.U. presence in the region, which eventually could work out being antagonistically

vis-à-vis to its policies and its interests. This is evident in the MEPP where the E.U. remains overshadowed by the U.S.A., on the other hand there are situations that interests and perceptions coincide like in the case of the Iranian nuclear program. So, there are cases that co-operation with the U.S.A. in the region could actually help achieve the goals set by the E.U. and elevate its position in the region helping to reduce the deficit gap. This seems also to be the perception of the E.U.'s High Representative Javier Solana when he says that *'We want to work with our friends and partners to help deliver solutions for the many contemporary problems that defy borders. We want to work with the United States and others in promoting a new "can-do multilateralism...A more united and effective EU is manifested in America's interest, and a close partnership with the United States will also help Europe achieve its international ambitions".'*(Solana, 2005, p.258)A constructive – engaging approach, in the cases where it is possible, with the only super-power of the world could be beneficial enhancing the weight of the E.U. in the region- this is something that authors like Silvestri also seem to advocate.(2003, p.50) and institutions like the European Council wish to promote *'The E.U. will work closely with the US, the UN and other external actors in pursuit of these goals.'*(Council of the European Union, 2004, p.12) This also seems to be supported by the facts found by the research conducted in the region as it can be seen by the following graph.

**Graph 4.**



**Source: Research contacted in Jordan**

It can be seen by the graph that, surprisingly for some, the local population overwhelmingly with 64% is in favour of seeing the E.U. acting in co-ordination with other actors in the region with only 26% stating that they would prefer seeing the E.U. acting alone.

From the course of this dissertation it can be concluded that the deficit if not expanding nevertheless still remains in place. The E.U. in relation to the internal factors (structurally-institutionally; and instruments-policies directed



at the region), as already has been examined, has significant shortfalls that constrain it from achieving its full capacities. The European Constitution even though not a solution to every problem had certain important features in the field of the external relations which could potentially help elevate the role and status of the E.U. Unfortunately, or for some fortunately, its rejection in French and the Netherlands is a bad omen for its future. The observation of the external factors that influence the E.U.'s external relations deficit like the other actors in region, U.S.A. and U.N., does not also look very promising. The U.S.A. was never before so actively engaged and interested in the region, The 'Greater Middle East Initiative' (GMEI)(Biscop, 2004, p.33) is a clear example of that. The U.N. on the other hand, a natural ally of the E.U. or vice versa, has been pushed aside by the U.S.A. as an obstacle to its strategic plans – examples are the war and subsequent invasion and occupation of Iraq without an U.N. mandate; the de facto protagonist role of the U.S.A. in the MEPP; the slow but steady substitution of the U.N. resolutions as a bases of solution concerning the Palestinian problem by American initiatives and plans like the famous 'Roadmap'; the threat of military intervention in Iran in relation to its nuclear program etc.

Having said that, the already positive effect that the E.U. has applied on the Middle East can not be overlooked. It seems that the E.U. policies have a long-term effect and scope and its influence can be seen in the long run. Examples of this can be said to be the positions that the E.U. had over the Arab – Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem, which when they were uttered in the late

70's they did not seem to be appealing to any side at that time, now seem to be more or less the standard base for any future settlement; or the engaging policies with regimes like in Iran. Nevertheless, this approach and policies as have already been said seem to work in the long term and not being able to produce immediate results. With the end of the 80's a number of crisis erupted (Yugoslavian war for example) showing the inability of the E.U. to act and clearly illustrating where the limits of the 'Civilian Power' concept lay for the E.U. In an region where 'realist' perception, logic and understanding seem to prevail the E.U. will be faced with the dilemma whether to continue in this route hoping only to be only a second player after the U.S.A. and seeing its policies baring fruits in the long run or else try to transform itself becoming a true international actor with all the pros and cons.

Concluding, the Middle East was, is, and will remain an important region for the E.U. that it will have to seriously engage with for the sake of its own interests in the first place. The Middle East is a key region in the E.U.'s energy future and potentially a very important trade partner just laying on its doorstep. It has been fully understand that the problems tantalising the region can no longer be overlooked and will have to be addressed by the E.U. if it doesn't want to see them transferred, one way or another, inside Europe. In a constantly changing and continuously globalised world, problems like the lack of democracy in the region as eloquently addressed by the 2004 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR);(United Nations Development Programme. Regional Bureau for Arab States. & Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development., 2004) the economic underdevelopment that is encountered in different countries of the region; but maybe most importantly the feeling of injustice and frustration that “Western” intervention causes in the region like the Iraq war and occupation; or Israeli “over-protection” in the framework of the MEPP leads to extreme forms of reaction translated in a rise of a militant form of Islam, for example.

All the before mentioned could lead to a ‘spillover’ effect to the E.U. seen in the form of the bomb attacks in Madrid and recently in London, or as migration waves heading to the European continent, or as instability in the world energy markets which are heavily dominated by Middle Eastern oil. The E.U. will have to find ways to reduce the external relations deficit already in place if it wants to effectively influence the course of events in the region of the Middle East in a way that its interests would be taken into account and its fundamental values and principles (Democracy, respect of human rights etc.)(Council of the European Union, 2003, p.5-6, 2004, p.5) are to be exported, sustained, and reproduced.

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## APPENDICES

## ANNEX I

**QUESTIONNAIRE**

1) *AGE*: \_\_\_\_\_

2) *SEX*:            **MALE**             **FEMALE**

3) *WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE E.U.?*

**a) POSITIVE**                       **b) RATHER POSITIVE**   
**c) RATHER NEGATIVE**                       **d) NEGATIVE**

4) *DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?*



**YES**       **NO**       **DO NOT KNOW**

**5) DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**

**YES**       **NO**       **DO NOT KNOW**

**6) HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**

**a) POSITIVE**                       **b) RATHER POSITIVE**

**c) RATHER NEGATIVE**               **d) NEGATIVE**

**7) DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**

**YES**       **NO**       **DO NOT KNOW**

8) ***DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?***

**AUTONOMOUS  FOLLOWER  DO NOT KNOW**

9) ***SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?***

**ALONE  WITH OTHERS  DO NOT KNOW**

10) ***DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?***

**YES  NO**

11) ***IN WHICH AREAS YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD TRY TO ENHANCE ITS CO-OPERATION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST? (You can choose more than one answer).***

**a)TRADE  b)HUMAN RIGHTS  c) FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES  d)CONFLICT PREVENTION  e)PEACE MAKING  f)OTHER  \_\_\_\_\_ (state)**



## ANNEX II

## Crosstabs

## Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * AGE	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


## SEX \* AGE Crosstabulation

		AGE												Total		
		19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	30	33	36		40	
SEX	MAL	Count	1		5	12	12	7	6	2	2			1	1	49
		% withi	2,0%		0,2%	4,5%	4,5%	4,3%	2,2%	4,1%	4,1%			2,0%	2,0%	0,0%
		% withi	0,0%		9,4%	1,4%	2,2%	3,6%	5,7%	0,0%	6,7%			0,0%	0,0%	9,0%
		% of T	1,0%		5,0%	2,0%	2,0%	7,0%	6,0%	2,0%	2,0%			1,0%	1,0%	9,0%
	FEM	Count		1	12	17	11	4	1	2	1	1	1			51
		% withi		2,0%	3,5%	3,3%	1,6%	7,8%	2,0%	3,9%	2,0%	2,0%				0,0%
		% withi		0,0%	0,6%	8,6%	7,8%	6,4%	4,3%	0,0%	3,3%	0,0%	0,0%			1,0%
		% of T		1,0%	2,0%	7,0%	1,0%	4,0%	1,0%	2,0%	1,0%	1,0%				1,0%
Total	Count		1	1	17	29	23	11	7	4	3	1	1	1	1	100
	% withi		1,0%	1,0%	7,0%	9,0%	3,0%	1,0%	7,0%	4,0%	3,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	0,0%
	% withi		0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	% of T		1,0%	1,0%	7,0%	9,0%	3,0%	1,0%	7,0%	4,0%	3,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	0,0%

## Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14,477 <sup>a</sup>	12	,271
Likelihood Ratio	17,288	12	,139
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 18 cells (69,2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


**SEX \* WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.? Crosstabulation**

			WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.?				Total
			POSITIVE	RATHER POSITIVE	RATHER NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	
SEX MALE	Count	27	8	6	8	49	
	% within SEX	55,1%	16,3%	12,2%	16,3%	100,0%	
	% within WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.	62,8%	66,7%	33,3%	53,3%	49,0%	
	% of Total	27,0%	8,0%	6,0%	8,0%	49,0%	
FEMALE	Count	16	4	12	7	39	
	% within SEX	31,4%	7,8%	23,5%	13,7%	100,0%	
	% within WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.	37,2%	33,3%	66,7%	46,7%	51,0%	
	% of Total	16,0%	4,0%	12,0%	7,0%	31,0%	
Total	Count	43	12	18	15	88	
	% within SEX	43,0%	12,0%	18,0%	15,0%	100,0%	
	% within WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE E.U.	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
	% of Total	43,0%	12,0%	18,0%	15,0%	88,0%	

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18,181 <sup>a</sup>	4	,001
Likelihood Ratio	22,906	4	,000
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,88.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%

**SEX \* DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?**  
Crosstabulation

			DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?		Total
			YES	NO	
SEX	MALE	Count	29	20	49
		% within SEX	59,2%	40,8%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?	36,7%	95,2%	49,0%
		% of Total	29,0%	20,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	50	1	51
		% within SEX	98,0%	2,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?	63,3%	4,8%	51,0%
		% of Total	50,0%	1,0%	51,0%
Total		Count	79	21	100
		% within SEX	79,0%	21,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE WORLD?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	79,0%	21,0%	100,0%


**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22,742 <sup>b</sup>	1	,000		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	20,460	1	,000		
Likelihood Ratio	26,681	1	,000		
Fisher's Exact Test				,000	,000
N of Valid Cases	100				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10,29.





**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%

**EX \* DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST**  
**Crosstabulation**


			DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?		Total
			YES	NO	
SEX	MALE	Count	29	20	49
		% within SEX	59,2%	40,8%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	45,3%	55,6%	49,0%
		% of Total	29,0%	20,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	35	16	51
		% within SEX	68,6%	31,4%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	54,7%	44,4%	51,0%
		% of Total	35,0%	16,0%	51,0%
Total		Count	64	36	100
		% within SEX	64,0%	36,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	64,0%	36,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,967 <sup>b</sup>	1	,325		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	,601	1	,438		
Likelihood Ratio	,969	1	,325		
Fisher's Exact Test				,406	,219
N of Valid Cases	100				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17,64.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


**\* HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
Crosstabulation**

			HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?				Total
			POSITIVE	RATHER POSITIVE	RATHER NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	
SEX MALE	Count		6	13	12	18	49
	% within SEX		12,2%	26,5%	24,5%	36,7%	100,0%
	% within HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?		54,5%	43,3%	44,4%	56,3%	49,0%
	% of Total		6,0%	13,0%	12,0%	18,0%	49,0%
SEX FEMALE	Count		5	17	15	14	51
	% within SEX		9,8%	33,3%	29,4%	27,5%	100,0%
	% within HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?		45,5%	56,7%	55,6%	43,8%	51,0%
	% of Total		5,0%	17,0%	15,0%	14,0%	51,0%
Total	Count		11	30	27	32	100
	% within SEX		11,0%	30,0%	27,0%	32,0%	100,0%
	% within HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT INVOLVEMENT OF THE E.U. IN THE MIDDLE EAST?		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total		11,0%	30,0%	27,0%	32,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1,418 <sup>a</sup>	3	,701
Likelihood Ratio	1,421	3	,701
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,39.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


**SEX \* DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**  
**Crosstabulation**

			DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?			Total
			YES	NO	DO NOT KNOW	
SEX	MALE	Count	32	7	10	49
		% within SEX	65,3%	14,3%	20,4%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	41,6%	87,5%	66,7%	49,0%
		% of Total	32,0%	7,0%	10,0%	49,0%
SEX	FEMALE	Count	45	1	5	51
		% within SEX	88,2%	2,0%	9,8%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	58,4%	12,5%	33,3%	51,0%
		% of Total	45,0%	1,0%	5,0%	51,0%
Total		Count	77	8	15	100
		% within SEX	77,0%	8,0%	15,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THE E.U. SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	77,0%	8,0%	15,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8,325 <sup>a</sup>	2	,016
Likelihood Ratio	8,926	2	,012
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 2 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,92.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%

**DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES? Crosstabulation**


			DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?			Total
			AUTONOMOU	FOLLOWER	DO NOT KNOW	
SEX	MALE	Count	21	20	8	49
		% within SEX	42,9%	40,8%	16,3%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?	50,0%	40,0%	100,0%	49,0%
		% of Total	21,0%	20,0%	8,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	21	30		51
		% within SEX	41,2%	58,8%		100,0%
		% within DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?	50,0%	60,0%		51,0%
		% of Total	21,0%	30,0%		51,0%
Total		Count	42	50	8	100
		% within SEX	42,0%	50,0%	8,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU CONSIDER THE E.U. AN AUTONOMOUS ACTOR IN THE REGION OR A FOLLOWER OF THE U.S.A. POLICIES?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	42,0%	50,0%	8,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9,964 <sup>a</sup>	2	,007
Likelihood Ratio	13,064	2	,001
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 2 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,92.





**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


**SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS ( etc.)? Crosstabulation**

			SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?				
			ALONE	WITH OTHERS	DO NOT KNOW		Total
SEX	MALE	Count	21	18	9	1	49
		% within SEX	42,9%	36,7%	18,4%	2,0%	100,0%
		% within SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?	80,8%	28,1%	100,0%	100,0%	49,0%
		% of Total	21,0%	18,0%	9,0%	1,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	5	46			51
		% within SEX	9,8%	90,2%			100,0%
		% within SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?	19,2%	71,9%			51,0%
		% of Total	5,0%	46,0%			51,0%
Total		Count	26	64	9	1	100
		% within SEX	26,0%	64,0%	9,0%	1,0%	100,0%
		% within SHOULD THE E.U. ACT ALONE IN THE REGION OR IN CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (U.S.A., U.N. etc.)?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	26,0%	64,0%	9,0%	1,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32,069 <sup>a</sup>	3	,000
Likelihood Ratio	37,084	3	,000
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 4 cells (50,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%

**X \* DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?**  
**Crosstabulation**


			DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?		Total
			YES	NO	
SEX	MALE	Count	39	10	49
		% within SEX	79,6%	20,4%	100,0%
		% within DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?	60,0%	28,6%	49,0%
	% of Total		39,0%	10,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	26	25	51
		% within SEX	51,0%	49,0%	100,0%
% within DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?		40,0%	71,4%	51,0%	
% of Total		26,0%	25,0%	51,0%	
Total	Count		65	35	100
	% within SEX		65,0%	35,0%	100,0%
	% within DID YOU KNOW THAT THE E.U. IS A MAJOR DONOR TO THE REGION THROUGH THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (€800M-€1bn per annum)?		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total		65,0%	35,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8,992 <sup>b</sup>	1	,003		
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	7,778	1	,005		
Likelihood Ratio	9,219	1	,002		
Fisher's Exact Test				,003	,002
N of Valid Cases	100				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17,15.



## Crosstabs

### Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: TH RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RUL OF LAW etc.?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%


**\* DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW etc.? Crosstabulation**

			DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW etc.?			
			YES	NO	DO NOT KNOW	Total
SEX	MALE	Count	37	9	3	49
		% within SEX	75,5%	18,4%	6,1%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW etc.?	47,4%	47,4%	100,0%	49,0%
		% of Total	37,0%	9,0%	3,0%	49,0%
	FEMALE	Count	41	10		51
		% within SEX	80,4%	19,6%		100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW etc.?	52,6%	52,6%		51,0%
		% of Total	41,0%	10,0%		51,0%
Total		Count	78	19	3	100
		% within SEX	78,0%	19,0%	3,0%	100,0%
		% within DO YOU THINK THAT THE E.U SHOULD LINK THE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ISSUES AS: THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW etc.?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	78,0%	19,0%	3,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3,219 <sup>a</sup>	2	,200
Likelihood Ratio	4,377	2	,112
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 2 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,47.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%




**DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS? Crosstabulation**

			DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?				Total
			YES	PROBABLY YES	PROBABLY NO	NO	
SEX MALE	Count		20	12	6	11	49
	% within SEX		40,8%	24,5%	12,2%	22,4%	100,0%
	% within DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?		57,1%	38,7%	50,0%	50,0%	49,0%
	% of Total		20,0%	12,0%	6,0%	11,0%	49,0%
FEMALE	Count		15	19	6	11	51
	% within SEX		29,4%	37,3%	11,8%	21,6%	100,0%
	% within DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?		42,9%	61,3%	50,0%	50,0%	51,0%
	% of Total		15,0%	19,0%	6,0%	11,0%	51,0%
Total	Count		35	31	12	22	100
	% within SEX		35,0%	31,0%	12,0%	22,0%	100,0%
	% within DO YOU THINK THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% of Total		35,0%	31,0%	12,0%	22,0%	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,256 <sup>a</sup>	3	,521
Likelihood Ratio	2,271	3	,518
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,88.



**Crosstabs**

**Case Processing Summary**

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
SEX * DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?	100	100,0%	0	,0%	100	100,0%

**DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?**  
**Crosstabulation**

			DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?				Total
			YES	PROBABLY YES	PROBABLY NO	NO	
SEX MALE	Count	9	12	3	25	49	
	% within SEX	18,4%	24,5%	6,1%	51,0%	100,0%	
	% within DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?	37,5%	44,4%	23,1%	69,4%	49,0%	
	% of Total	9,0%	12,0%	3,0%	25,0%	49,0%	
SEX FEMALE	Count	15	15	10	11	51	
	% within SEX	29,4%	29,4%	19,6%	21,6%	100,0%	
	% within DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?	62,5%	55,6%	76,9%	30,6%	51,0%	
	% of Total	15,0%	15,0%	10,0%	11,0%	51,0%	
Total	Count	24	27	13	36	100	
	% within SEX	24,0%	27,0%	13,0%	36,0%	100,0%	
	% within DO YOU THINK THE IRAQI SITUATION IS AN OBSTACLE FOR THE E.U. - MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
	% of Total	24,0%	27,0%	13,0%	36,0%	100,0%	

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,011 <sup>a</sup>	3	,012
Likelihood Ratio	11,377	3	,010
N of Valid Cases	100		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6,37.

